The Myth of the Ascendant Left: What Super Tuesday Really Taught Us
There has been a myth being perpetuated by the punditry and the loudest (i.e. fringe) voices on social media that the far left (i.e. “progressives”) have been ascendant in the Democratic Party, especially since 2016. The cold, hard data says otherwise. Demographic trends and shouting do not determine elections. It’s who shows up to vote that matters.
Setting aside the misguided conflating of an AOC upset in 2018 as the tip of the spear of a broader trend, what did we learn two years ago? The data show that the 2018 midterms were a bloodbath for extreme left candidates and all of those supported by Justice Democrats, while so-called “moderates” took back the House, aided by resurgence in turnout and appeals to suburban voters.
Fast forward to 2020. The first three nominating contests of Iowa, New Hampshire and Nevada consisted of two caucuses, a primary neighbor to Vermont, and significant White and Latino populations.
In other words, they were geographically, demographically and structurally stacked in Sanders favor. Between 70% and 80% of the combined votes were against him. Yet somehow, he was deemed to be the freight train of a frontrunner.
Therefore, should we really be surprised by Biden’s Super Tuesday results? Sure, it makes for greater theater to cast this as entirely the magic of Jim Clyburn’s endorsement three days earlier, but how does that explain Virginia turnout almost doubling from 2016? That may be the most significant metric from the entire day. A massively motivated anti-Trump electorate that rejected Sanders and mirrored the party’s 2018 midterm profile.
Fast forward to Michigan. There’s another elephant in the room that suggests the Democratic Party is not nearly as left leaning as some have suggested. It’s Hillary.
The significant drop in primary turnout among Democrats in 2016 versus the prior cycle suggests that Sanders’ 2016 numbers were artificially inflated — just like Trump’s six months later — by running against an uninspiring opponent who resulted in a lot of voters staying home.
While the narrative heading into this year’s Michigan contest predictably focused on Sanders’ surprise success there in 2016, it failed to acknowledge that his victory was equally a reflection of depressed turnout by so many Democrats, particularly African Americans (just like the general election that followed).
Which brings me to a final conclusion. Do Democrats really need the loudest voices of the far left in order to generate a turnout model that more closely resembles 2008 and 2012?
Once again, prepare for endlessly predictable analyses as the pundits trot out old cliches about how a nominee must “bring the party together,” “repair the fissures,” etc. I say “No.” That is not what the nominee must do. The nominee needs to raise African American turnout closer to 2012 levels in Philadelphia, Detroit, Milwaukee, Cleveland and Miami. Five urban centers in five swing states. That’s it. Game over.
The Democrats do not need the Bernie or Bust crowd or the Jill Stein crowd. Even with a trio of turnout headwinds from stay-at-home voters, third party voters and White working-class defections, Clinton would have carried PA, WI, MI, and FL if Black turnout didn’t plummet in a few urban areas.
So the data clearly indicates that 1) the Democratic Party has not veered way left, 2) the loudest “progressive voices” are overrated and not a required element of a winning coalition, 3) we should not be surprised that 2020 voting indicates Sanders’ base as a percentage of the Democratic electorate has actually shrunk, because his 2016 figures were artificially inflated; and 4) along with Newton’s three laws of motion, the recurring head fake and myth of the “youth vote” remains a bi-annual fever dream that will never go away and never cease to disappoint.